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INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth and concomitant deregulation of the global
economy has produced a myriad of social issues not sufficiently
accounted for by state domestic laws or international legal systems.
Among the more abhorrent social problems created and proliferated by
the existence of a global economy lacking global regulation is the
insidious practice of exploiting child labor. Built on the shoulders of the
technology boom and expansion of the multinational corporation
("MNC"), the global village operates without a sheriff. In this village,
where a premium is placed upon the ethic of profit maximization, where
an endless cycle of hosts offer up their young behind closed doors and
beyond the reach of those who care, children are being put to work.
The purpose of this note is to both draw attention to the negative
interplay between the proliferation of the MNC and the abusive
employment of child labor, and to advocate a practical solution to the
problem. Part I of this note provides a brief history of the practice of
child labor, highlighting the shift in the social utility that once
accompanied the practice. Part II maps out the emergence of the MNC.
Here, the focus is on the modern incarnation of the M4NC and on
exploring the sociopolitical factors that preclude effective legal control.
Part III examines the more significant mechanisms historically used to
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combat problems such as the work of international and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), as well as the recent use of
consumers as a tool of corporate change. As this note reveals, few of
these methods have been, or have any hope of being independently
effective. Part IV introduces the concept of self-regulation through
corporate codes. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of this form
of corporate control and analyzes how it may likely succeed in areas
where global law enforcement has failed. Lastly, Part V sets forth the
argument that corporate codes, while flawed, are the only practical
solution to the problem of child labor, and concludes with suggestions
for ensuring their effectiveness.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHILD LABOR
Child labor has been utilized throughout history.' With its benign
roots in agrarian society, the practice of employing child labor became
increasingly noxious with the onslaught of the industrial revolution. The
British were the first to take notice of this trend, and by the early 19th
century enacted their first child labor laws.2 At the same time in the
1. There is no internationally endorsed definition of child labor or universally
prescribed methodology for collecting data on child labor. Therefore, this note will
utilize the definition of child labor delineated in the United Nations Convention on the
Right of the Child. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 28 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1456 (1990). Under the convention, a child is defined
presumptively as a person under the age of 18. It deplores child labor where it is
"detrimental" to the child's health, development, and education. Susan L. Pollet,
Outside Counsel: The Continued Exploitation of Child Labor at Home and Abroad,
N.Y. L.J. Apr. 15, 2004, at 4. However, this note was written with an appreciation that,
[n]ot all work performed by children is detrimental or exploitative. Child labor does
not usually refer to "light work," after school work, or legitimate apprenticeship
opportunities for young people. Nor does it refer to young people helping out in the
family business or on the family farm. Rather, the "child labor" of concern is
generally employment that prevents effective school attendance, and which is often
performed under conditions hazardous to the physical and mental health of the child.
Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor, The Apparel Industry and
Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem? at 9 (1996),
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/apparel/apparel.pdf.
2. The first law that was effective, the Factory Act of 1833, forbade the
employment of children under the age of 9. It also limited the number of hours older
children could work: between ages 9 and 13 the limit was nine hours per day; between
ages 13 and 18 the limit was twelve hours. The law also provided for state
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United States, the use of child labor had become prevalent, and by the
20th century, more than two million children in the U.S. had been put to
work.3 With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, children were
forced to tend to the ever-growing number of machines that lined the
then "modem" factory floors. These children worked for long hours
with poor pay, and under extremely dangerous conditions.4
The problem of child labor has always been a divisive issue.
Chicago School economist Gary Becker, for example, argued that
"[p]utting children to work should be construed as a rational household
decision given the available alternatives and should therefore be
excluded from the realm of normative or ethical judgments."5  This
point, while overstated, does reveal an important social utility derived
from the work of child laborers.
Many families rely on the income produced by their children and to
that extent, when fair salaries are paid and the work conditions are
reasonable, child labor can be, and often is, beyond ethical discussion.
Today, however, in part as a result of the growth of MNCs, it is
estimated that there are 246 million child laborers.6  Seventy-five
percent of them perform hazardous jobs such as mining or working with
chemicals, pesticides or dangerous machinery.7 According to the
International Labour Office ("ILO"),8
inspections. However, the Factory Act applied only to the textile industry and
exempted many other industries, such as shipbuilding and the mining of iron and coal.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Child Labour, available at http://www.britannica.com/ebi/
article-234147.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Robert Crawford, Soccer Balls Made for Children by Children? Child Labor
in Pakistan, INSEAD 5, available at http://www.hec.unil.ch/ocadot/CASES/
soccercase.doc (citing GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976)). Moreover, there has been some criticism
highlighting the ethnocentric quality of imposing child labor standards on a global
community which lacks the requisite moral consensus; Karen Vossler Champion, Who
Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade and International Labor Standards,
22 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 181, 214-15 (Fall 1996).
6. World Briefing United Nations: Millions of Children in Dangerous Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 14.
7. Todd Pugatch, Historical Development of the Sweatshop (Apr. 30, 1998),
http://www.unc.edu/-andrewsr/ints092/sweat.html.
8. The ILO will be discussed in greater detail later in this note. For a brief history
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[i]t is estimated that there were some 211 million children ages 5 to
14 at work in economic activity in the world in 2000. This accounts
for a little less than one-fifth of all children in this age group. About
73 million working children are less than 10 years old. The total
economically active child population 5-17 years old is estimated at
352 million children.
9
The Asia-Pacific region has the "largest number of child workers in
the 5-14 [year old] age category at 127.3 million." Sub-Saharan Africa
has 48 million, while Latin America and the Caribbean come in third
with 17.4 million.' 0
While the use of this labor seemingly occurs in the most desolate of
places, its source can be traced to industrialized nations and even to our
own shores."' Monsanto, for example, the second largest seed company
in the world, is a U.S.-based MNC. In India alone, Monsanto employs
15,300 child laborers in its cottonseed production. 2  Nike Inc., the
American based apparel company and "the world's largest global
marketer of athletic footwear ... and equipment,... out-sources 97% of
its footwear products to factories in four countries: China, Indonesia,
Thailand and Vietnam. Those countries are all characterized by highly
repressive and corrupt governmental regimes that provide little if any
enforcement of their own labor laws."
'13
In the last few years, the issue of child labor has once again moved
to the forefront of the national consciousness. 4  While the
aforementioned figures indicate that the problem is far from solved,
see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; Pollet, supra note 1.
9. ILO, Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour (Apr. 2002),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/others/globalest.pdf. This
piece is an excellent source for information and statistics on child labor. We suggest
that anyone who is interested in this subject visit this web site.
10. ILO, Facts on IPEC's Strategy to Eliminate Child Labor, http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/ipec/publ/download/factsheets/fsipecstrategyO303.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2006).
11. Id.
12. India Committee of the Netherlands, Child Labour and Trans-National Seed
Companies in Hybrid Cotton Seed Production in Andhra Pradesh (Apr. 24, 2003),
http://www.indianet.nl/cotssec2.html.
13. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the
Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 399 (2005).
14. Amy Brecount White, Putting an End to Sweatshops; Individual Consumers
Really Can Make a Difference, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1997, at E05.
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recent legal and social developments hold promise for a brighter future.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MNC AND THE LEGAL PARADIGM WHICH
FAILS TO CONTROL IT
The use of child labor is a historically common practice made
treacherous by the mechanization of production that accompanied the
Industrial Revolution. 5 Over the last fifty years, the employers of child
labor have grown and spread beyond their humble beginnings; where
once they brought local children to local factories, they now exist in far,
foreign places, in all comers of the world, and, largely as a result of
globalization, these corporations have slowly evolved into MNCs. 1
6
A. The Multinational Corporation
The modem MNC is based on the Dutch and British East India
Companies of the 17th century.' 7 While it is difficult to pinpoint the
exact moment the MNC appeared, most economists and business
historians place its emergence in the second half of the 19th century. 8
As Professor Muchlinski explains, 9 the history of the MNC can be
neatly divided into three periods.20 The first period, which began with
15. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
16. Joseph J. Savitsky & Shahid Javed Burki, Globalization and the Multinational
Corporation, in THE JAPAN PROGRAM'S WORKING PAPER SERIES ON GLOBALIZATION,
available at http://www.iadb.org/int/jpn/English/support-files/GLB%203%20Glob.and
%20Multinational%2OCorporation.pdf.
17. Id. at5.
18. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 20
(Blackwell 1995).
19. Professor Muchlinski is a Professor of Law and International Business at the
University of Kent, Kent Law School. He is the Principal Adviser to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on their major issues papers series
concerning international investment agreements, and he has written many scholarly
articles on the development of the MNC. University of Kent, Kent Law School,
Professor Peter Muchlinski, http://www.kent.ac.uk/law/people/left-dept/
muchlinski.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
20. Muchlinsky, supra note 18, at 20. Also, it should be noted that while Professor
Muchlinski refers to the subject of his study as multinational enterprises because he
wishes to avoid the strictures that the term multinational corporations implies, we use
the term multinational corporations in a loose and non-restrictive way so that the
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the creation of the "internationally integrated, privately owned
manufacturing firm[,] 2  ended with the outbreak of World War I.22
The second period lasted until the start of World War 11,23 and the final,
or third period, began in 1945 and continues through today.24
The first period was dominated by the British.2 ' However, because
their major assets were located and managed overseas with no British-
based assets or operations, the British companies of that period would
not be considered MNCs today. 6 The second period saw the continued
development of the MNC.27 The growth of the MNC, however, was
significantly hindered by the economic instability caused by World War
1.2' The third period is categorized by the "unprecedented importance of
the multinational corporation in international production. ' 29
The modem MNC is defined as a corporation or enterprise that
manages production facilities in at least two countries.30 There are three
types of MNC.31  First, horizontally integrated multinational
corporations manage production facilities that are located in different
countries but produce the same or similar products.32 Second, vertically
integrated multinational corporations manage production facilities in one
or several countries in order to produce products that serve as input to its
production facilities in another country or countries.33  Lastly,
diversified multinational corporations manage production facilities
located in different countries that are neither horizontally nor vertically
difference between our use of the term in this work and that of Professor Muchlinski's
is only cosmetic.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 25.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Id. (although legitimate MNCs did exist in this period, many of them based in
Germany).
27. Id. at 22-23.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id. at 25. For a more detailed history of the MNC see id. at 20.
30. Wikipedia, Multinational Corporation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MNC (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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integrated.
3 4
Today, the MNC is a dominant force in the global economy, and
while it is certainly capable of great good, it has been shown that the
opposite may also be true. As early as 1816, Thomas Jefferson warned
against the proliferation of the corporation: "I hope we shall take
warning from the example and crush in it's [sic] birth the aristocracy of
our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our
government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws [of] our
country. 35 In hindsight, Jefferson's concerns seem prophetic.
As of 2003, more than 65,000 multinational corporations were doing
business and controlling assets in more than one country ....
[Multinational corporations] increased their number of exports from
25 percent in the 1980s to one-third in the 1990s. [Multinational
corporations] participate in over 60 percent of world trade, playing a
significant role in production, distribution, and sale of products from
developing and developed countries alike. Sales of the largest 100
multinational corporations increased from $3.2 trillion in 1990 to
nearly $4.8 trillion in 2000. Furthermore, of the world's 15 largest
budgets, six are governmental and nine are corporate; each of the top
15 [multinational corporations] has a budget greater than the GDPs
of at least 120 countries ... 36
The size of these MNCs greatly hampers the abilities of
governments to control them.37 Additionally, there are two factors, the
combined effects of which make the proliferation of the MNC a problem
in the realm of child labor. First, as noted above, the industrial countries
which most NvNCs call "home," early on legislated against the practice
of employing such labor 38 - forcing the MNCs to find fertile ground in
34. Id.
35. Wikipedia, Talk:Thomas Jefferson, at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/
Talk:ThomasJefferson (citing Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Logan (1816), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 138 (1953)).
36. Shauna J. Sadowski, Bringing Multinational Corporations into the
Environmental Treaty-Making Process Through the UN Global Compact 1 (2005),
available at http://www.pon.org/downloads/ienl4_2sadowski.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2006).
37. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 2. For example, in the United
States in 1916, Congress passed the Keating-Owns Child Labor Act, which banned the
sale of goods made by children under a specified age threshold. Id. Though this act
900 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
foreign countries where child labor laws are not as restrictive. Second,
the countries in which this fertile ground existed did not have the
complex economies necessary to support their own corporations, thus
these countries remained underdeveloped and susceptible to the
temptations offered by foreign investment.3 9 As a result, corporations
that wish to utilize child labor often simply base themselves in an
industrialized country, and either establish a subsidiary in the Third
World, or outsource their production needs to smaller companies already
there.40 Such a practice is attractive to an international player because it
provides cheap labor and the competitive edge that is increasingly
necessary in today's global economy.4' This intense competition results
in a need for cheaper production in order for profit margins to rise and
final products to be made at an increasingly low cost.
4 2
In order to meet the competitive demand, companies employ young
children in underdeveloped countries, paying them substantially less
than the law would allow in an industrialized nation.4 3 Even worse, the
was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court, it marked the beginning of a
movement that has continued to the present day. Id. At the same time, the National
Child Labor Committee, an organization dedicated to the eradication of child labor, was
created and later helped pass The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). Id. The
main objective of this congressional act was to "eliminate labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and well-being of workers. The [FLSA] also prohibited child labor in all industries
engaged in producing goods in inter-state commerce." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Globalization forces companies, which would otherwise operate in discrete and
unrelated markets, to compete directly with one another. Crawford, supra note 5, at 11.
42. But see Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What's
Missing?, 16 THE LABOR LAW 349, 349 (Winter/Spring 2001) (arguing that in the
information age, this fierce competition is in fact helping to create and spread new
attention to human rights issues based on the calculation that consumers are watching
and care).
43. "In China, workers at Wellco Factory making shoes for Nike are paid 16
cents/hour... 11-12 hour shifts, 7 days a week, 77-84 hours per week; workers are
fined if they refuse overtime, and they are not paid an extra rate for overtime hours."
Radley Balko, Labor: Sweatshops and Globalization, available at
http://www.aworldconnected.org/article.php/525.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
Alternatively, the current Federal minimum wage in the United States is $5.15 an hour.
See U.S. Dept. of Labor web site, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2006). A study commissioned by the India Committee of the Netherlands, the
International Labor Rights Fund of the USA and Eine Welt Netz NRW of Germany
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company internalizes the economic benefits; thus, when the goods are
imported back into the U.S. market, consumers never see the savings. "
For the corporation producing or manufacturing goods, this
economic magic trick is simple. A company need only find a country
with a high rate of poverty, a low level of education, and lenient or
unenforced child labor laws.45 Underdeveloped countries benefit greatly
from the presence of MNCs, and the incentives are skewed against
regulating them.46 They create wealth in the states where they operate
by providing jobs, producing goods and services, introducing
technologies, and developing markets.47
As a result, a common trend emerges. Countries that wish to reap
the benefits from the presence of MNCs will often competitively seek
them out. In doing so, these developing countries continuously relax
their employment laws so that subcontractors in these countries can offer
the MNCs the cheapest cost of production. "The cost of labor in
underdeveloped economies is often kept artificially low by repressive,
anti-labor legislation and governmental action."'48  This trend is
sometimes referred to as a "race to the bottom.
4 9
The presence of foreign investment in these developing countries
also serves as a platform for the creation of their own export
economies, 50 as well as a myriad of other economic benefits that
increase the incentive to allow the use of child labor.51
found that the use of child laborers in cotton seed production creates savings for the
company of up to 12 percent. Coordination Gegen BAYER-Gefahren (Coalition
against Bayer-Dangers), Low Cottonseed Procurement Price Spawns Child Labour,
available at http://www.cbgnetwork.org/1221.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
44. Champion, supra note 5, at 184.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Murphy, supra note 13, at 397.
48. Champion, supra note 5, at 185.
49. Crawford, supra note 5, at 11. The race to the bottom is facilitated by three
factors applicable to many, if not most production schemes. First, the products must be
homogeneous and, in that, the major determining factor in a comparison is price.
Second, legal regulations must form an important component of the cost structure.
Third, MNCs must not incur a substantial transaction cost when moving plants. Klause
E. Meyer, Perspectives on Multinational Enterprises in Emerging Economies:
Perspective, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STuD. 259 (July 1, 2004).
50. Murphy, supra note 13, at 397.
51. The increasing power of the [multinational corporation] is also represented
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In fact, in 2001, 28% of foreign direct investment ("FDI") flowed to
developing countries. 2 In that same year, the ten biggest developing
country recipients of FDI accounted for 75% of total flows to that
sector.53  Considering the enormous benefits reaped by the
underdeveloped countries that allow the MNC to operate with impunity,
it is foolish to leave the responsibility of regulating MNC behavior in the
hands of these countries. Unfortunately, no legal system exists which
enables the willing nations to take on the task.
B. A Failed Legal System
The problem of child labor was decidedly simpler when national
corporations were employing children from their "home country. 54 The
proliferation of the MNC complicated the issue exponentially, and
domestic laws as well as international legal policies of both then and
now have been ill-equipped to handle the problem."
In accordance with the principles of national sovereignty, neither
the United States, nor any other nation can simply apply its domestic
laws to the wholly domestic corporations of a foreign country.56
through foreign direct investment ("FDI"). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, in
which a foreign corporation acquires more than 10 percent control of a domestic
enterprise, increased from $94 million to $866 billion between 1996 and 2000. This
has a particularly profound effect on developing countries in which foreign direct
investment (FDI) constitutes a country's largest source of external finance. In
developing countries, cross-border mergers and acquisitions increased by 50 percent
from 1995 to 1999.
Sadowski, supra note 36, at 2.
52. Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for
Standard Setting and Compliance, 37 INT'L LAW 69, 77 (Spring 2003). Foreign direct
investment ("FDI") is the movement of capital across national borders in a way that
permits the investor control over the acquired asset. FDI has grown in importance in
today's global economy, with FDI stocks now constituting over 20% of global GDP.
Wikipedia, Foreign Direct Investment, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FDI (last visited
Mar. 15, 2006).
53. Redmond, supra note 52, at 77.
54. The use of the term "home country" here is intended to mean the country where
the corporation is headquartered. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY
169 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
55. Id. at 171-72.
56. See id. at 172; See also Wikipedia, Sovereignty, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Sovereignty#Sovereignty_in international law (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
2006] HOW CORPORATE CODES CAN 903
SA VE OUR CHILDREN
Similarly, established international policy prevents a country from
applying its laws to the actions of a foreign subsidiary of a domestic
corporation. In other words, the existing international policies prevent
the application of "home country extraterritoriality."57 Unfortunately,
the international norms which should operate as an effective method of
regulating MNC behavior were established in a time "when corporations
typically confined their operations to a single country," and therefore do
not adequately address the problems posed by globalization.58 These
laws prevent willing governments from prohibiting their domestic
companies from employing child labor abroad. Of these norms, the
greatest effect can be attributed to the nationality principle5 9 and the
territorial principle as well as its corollary, the effects doctrine.60
The effects doctrine, arguably the most promising of the three for
allowing home country extraterritoriality, allows for the extension of
territorial jurisdiction when the acts occurring outside of the nation
affect, in a "discrete, foreseeable, and substantial" way, the nation
wishing to apply its legal regime.61 Unfortunately, an application of this
principle to child labor law would be strained and commentators doubt
57. BLUMBERG, supra note 54, at 169. ("Home country extraterritoriality" uses
enterprise principles in "executing a nation's political or legal policies with respect to
the domestic parent corporation of a multinational group, [which in turn] means
extraterritorial application of the national program to the foreign components of the
group.").
58. Id.
59. The nationality principle states that a business entity's nationality is determined
by the state in which it is incorporated, and that a subsidiary does not take on the
nationality of its parent. Id. The result of this doctrine is that a foreign subsidiary of an
American MNC is not considered an American corporation and is, therefore, not subject
to the laws applicable to American corporations. However, the American modification
of the nationality principle substantially modifies the traditional rule to allow for the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries where doing so advances particularly
important regulatory programs in the home country. At the time this note was written,
the authors were unaware of any application of this doctrine to the area of child labor.
Id.
60. Id. Because the effects doctrine expands the potential power of the territorial
principle to reach legal abuses such as the employment of child labor, this note will
limit the discussion to the effects doctrine, its interpretation and its requirements.
61. This language was adopted from the American Law Institute, in its Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See id. at 172.
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that it could be applied to economic objectives. 62 Therefore, countries
that have taken a formal stance against child labor within their own
borders are left with little recourse to address the problem outside of
them.63
III. EXTRA-LEGAL METHODS FOR DEALING WITH CHILD LABOR
The inability of the legal system to address the issue of child labor
has created a need for extra-legal remedies, remedies that are not
constrained by the principles of international law. The most notable
extra-legal remedy is the work of international organizations, non-
governmental agencies, and conscientious consumers.
A. International Organizations
The work done on behalf of child laborers by international
organizations cannot be discounted. The most notable organization is
the International Labor Organization ("ILO"),64 and its specialized
program, the International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour ("IPEC").65
Since its inception in 1919, the ILO has enacted 185 conventions
aimed at establishing a uniform labor standard.66 These standards, if
62. Blumberg, supra note 54, at 176.
63. Id. For a more thorough discussion on these international principles and their
effect on the ability of a nation to apply its domestic laws outside its borders, see
BLUMBERG, supra note 54.
64. The ILO's "primary role is to promote the global community's acceptance of
international labor standards through the adoption of conventions, guidelines, and
recommendations after consultation with governments, labor unions, and employers."
Developments in the Law - Legal Tools for Altering Labor Conditions Abroad, 118
HARv. L. REv. 2202, 2205 (2005) [hereinafter Harvard Developments in the Law]. The
ILO, "created by the treaty of Versailles in 1919, and adopted by the United Nations
immediately following World War H, has been at the forefront of the movement." Id. at
2206.
65. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Absent from it, among many other
noteworthy organizations, are the United Nations International Children's Emergency
Fund ("UNICEF") and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"). These organizations, as well as many others, continue to make strides of
varying impact in the area of child labor, but will not receive mention in this note which
is primarily concerned with the corporation's impact on the issue of child labor.
66. Harvard Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 2205. Convention C138,
2006] HOW CORPORATE CODES CAN 905
SAVE OUR CHILDREN
globally adopted, could reasonably fill the vacuum left by the legal
system's inability to address this type of transnational problem.
Unfortunately, the ILO "lacks real enforcement powers and relies
primarily on 'moral persuasion, publicity, shame, diplomacy, dialogue,
and technical assistance' to urge compliance with its conventions."67 To
date, less than 60% of ILO member countries have ratified all of the ILO
core labor conventions, amongst which is the effective abolition of child
labor.68
IPEC is a younger organization. Created in 1992, it has advanced
the progressive goal of eliminating child labor.69 IPEC works to achieve
Minimum Age Convention, adopted in 1973, states that "[t]he minimum age specified in
pursuance of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be less than the age of completion of
compulsory schooling and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 years." Paragraph 1
establishes that the purpose of the convention is to define a minimum age for
employment. See ILO, Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment (June 26, 1973), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138.
Another key convention is C182, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, adopted in
1999. This convention calls for members to take immediate action against the worst
forms of child labor and defines the worst forms of child labor as:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking
of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the
production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties;
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely
to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
ILO, Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour, 38 I.L.M. 1207 (June 17, 1999), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C 182.
67. See Harvard Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 2207 (quoting Daniel
S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATTWTO Enforcement Regime for
International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 163, 164 (Lance A. Compa and Stephen F. Diamond eds., Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press 1996)).
68. Amongst which is the effective abolition of child labor. Id. at 2206.
69. See id. at 2206. "While the goal of IPEC remains the prevention and
elimination of all forms of child labour, the priority target groups for IPEC's action are
the worst forms of child labour . . . ." For a full definition of the worst forms of child
labour as defined in Convention No. 182, see supra note 66. See International Labour
Organization, IPEC Action Against Child Labour: Highlights 2004, (October 2004),
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this by employing several methods: through country-based programs
which promote policy reform, build institutional capacity and put in
place concrete measures to end child labor; through raising awareness;
and through mobilization aimed at changing social attitudes and
promoting the ratification and effective implementation of ILO child
labor conventions. 70 As results of these efforts, hundreds of thousands
of children have been either withdrawn from work and rehabilitated or
have been prevented from entering the workforce altogether.7 ' Non-
governmental organizations have had similar, though varying success by
employing different means than their politically connected
counterparts.72
B. Non-Governmental Organizations73
NGOs work on standardizing codes, raising public awareness,
creating solidarity with claimants, conducting research, gathering
evidence, and advocating with governments and companies.7 4
Additionally, "NGOs have progressively entered areas traditionally
reserved for governments, [including workers rights]... becoming
community organizers with greater expertise than the inter-
governmental organizations mandated in the same issue areas. ' 75 As an
example, Sudhaar, a Pakistani NGO that draws its funding from the ILO,
began to set up educational facilities for children working in leather
tanneries. The program was so successful that foreign NGOs and inter-
governmental agencies encouraged Sudhaar to expand its work into
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/download/
implementation_2004_en.pdf.
70. See IPEC Action Against Child Labour, supra note 69, at 15.
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id. at 49.
73. A non-governmental organization or NGO is an organization that is not part of
a government and was not established by states. The term is typically restricted to
social, cultural, legal, and environmental groups having goals that are primarily
noncommercial. Wikipedia, Non-governmental Organization, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/NGO.
74. I.R.E.N.E., Controlling Corporate Wrongs: Liability of Multinational
Corporations - Legal Possibilities, Initiatives and Strategies for Civil Society 8 (Mar.
20-21, 2000), http://www.mvo-platform.nl/mvotekst/irene%20controlling%20corporate
%20wrongs.pdf.
75. Crawford, supra note 5, at 12.
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other areas as an instrument of change.76
NGOs have also worked with governments around the world to
bring legal pressures against MNCs employing child labor. In Britain,
for example, Oxfam and the World Development Movement ("WDM")
have been pressing the British government to change the law in favor of
making it easier to sue corporations for failing to comply with labor
standards. 7' However, despite the efforts of the NGOs and international
organizations, it is estimated that there are still 246 million child
laborers around the world.78
C. Consumerism as a Force of Social Change
MNCs are concerned primarily with the bottom line.79 This focus
on profit maximization, when combined with the power possessed by an
informed consumer, produces an interesting synergetic result that has the
possibility to inspire enormous change in the area of child labor.
A predicate, however, to consumer power is consumer knowledge.
The onslaught of the information age has brought change to many areas
of corporate life. One of the infinite impacts of the information age is
that corporations are finding it more difficult to keep the activities of
their subsidiaries out of the public view.8° When consumers are made
aware of wrongful corporate activities, they may react as consumers,
possibly boycotting the MNC's product, thereby injuring the bottom
line.8 A 1995 survey reveals just how serious consumers are about
labor issues.82 According to the survey, "78 percent of respondents said
that they would prefer to shop at retail stores that had committed
76. Id.
77. I.R.E.N.E., supra note 74, at 9.
78. World Briefing United Nations: Millions of Children in Dangerous Jobs, supra
note 6.
79. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
80. Debora L. Spar, Creating Corporate Social Responsibility, BLUEPRINT MAG.,
June 2001, available at http://www.ppionline.org/ppici.cfm?knlgAreaID=115&
subseclD=900026&contentlD=964.
81. Id. For example, in Europe, consumers have boycotted Asian carpets made
using child labor. UNICEF, Children's Rights, the Progress of Nations, Children Pay
High Price for Cheap Labour, http://www.unicef.org/pon95/chil0016.html. See also
White, supra note 14.
82. Spar, supra note 80.
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themselves to ending garment-worker abuse; 84 percent said they would
pay $1 extra on a $20 item to ensure that the garment had been made in
a worker friendly environment. 8 3  Surveys like this lead some to
conclude that consumer human rights preferences are not incompatible
with MNCs' profit orientation. 4 These commentators, like us, see
consumer power as a formidable instrument of change.
81
There is no better example of the consumer's enormous power than
the Kathie Lee Gifford incident. In 1996, Ms. Gifford was thrust into
the epicenter of the child labor issue. After lending her name to a
discount line of women's clothing, it was discovered that the clothes
were the product of Central American child labor.86 The discovery
prompted a severe and uniform outcry from consumers. 7 Whether as a
result of this public outrage or her own conscience, Ms. Gifford is now
one of the most outspoken personalities on the issue of child labor.8
Additionally, at a time when few politicians were focusing on the issue,
scores of activists and media personalities suddenly surrounded the issue
of child labor, bringing to it an attention that it had long ago lost.89
This example is illustrative of consumer power, a power which
some have already attempted to harness. During the first term of the
Clinton administration, Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich launched the
83. Id. A similar survey conducted one year later produced the same results.
Vivian Marino, Sweatshops Becoming A Retail Issue; Stores Find Themselves Being
Held Accountable For Human-Rights Abuses, SUN-SENTINEL, June 23, 1996, at 1. It
should be noted that these surveys may overstate the reality of the consumer sentiment.
The two surveys were taken in the mid 90s when the economy was in an upswing, and
we cannot know how people would respond in a sluggish or recessive economy.
Additionally, as a general matter, one cannot discount the possibility that the people
taking the survey were lying. No one wants to sound cheap when talking about child
labor.
84. Redmond, supra note 52, at 73.
85. See White, supra note 14.
86. Spar, supra note 80.
87. William Anderson, Kathie Lee's Children, THE FREE MARKET Vol. 14 Num. 9
(Sept. 1996), available at http://www.mises.org/freemarketdetail.asp?control=45
&sortorder=articledate (the lobbyists for the National Labor Committee Union
Lobbyists, a labor union, demanded that the government halt any imports from Ms.
Grifford's Honduras factory).
88. Id; see also Beth J. Harpaz, As Sweatshop'Abuses Unfold, Retailers Take Heat
On Celebrity Labels, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1996, at 2.
89. Id; Harpaz, supra note 88.
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"No Sweat" campaign. 90 This endeavor attempted to steer MNCs in the
garment industry into compliance with labor laws by exposing the
retailers who were using overseas child labor.9' The Labor Department
also published the Labor Department Trendsetter list.92  The list
highlighted the MNCs that "demonstrated a commitment to U.S. labor
laws, and to monitoring overseas production.93 In effect, the "No
Sweat" campaign utilized the duality of consumer power by punishing
malfeasant corporations with negative publicity and rewarding those
corporations that refuse to employ child labor with positive publicity. It
is in this milieu that MNCs are becoming profoundly aware of consumer
power, and they have begun to respond, primarily by instituting
corporate codes.94
IV. CORPORATE CODES AND THE SELF-REGULATION OF THE MNC
MNCs themselves have begun to recognize the divergence between
their actions and social expectations. 9' Consequently, and considering
the possible negative economic impact of not changing their behavior,
many MNCs have "embraced the movement toward voluntary codes of
conduct. [These codes] ... inculcate key norms in the field of labor,
human rights, consumer protection, anticorruption, and the
environment."
96
Corporate codes, as the term is used in this note, can be described in
the following manner: (1) they are voluntary in nature, (2) typically
consisting of a series of principles, (3) standards or guidelines, which are
90. Anderson, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Frank Swoboda, Anti-Sweatshop Program Tailoredfor the Times, WASH. POST,
May 30, 1996, at A29.
93. Id. (This made use of what is known as the "spotlight phenomenon.").
94. Hermstadt, supra note 42.
95. The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance illustrates
the public's expectations. It qualifies the "corporation's economic objective of profit
and shareholder wealth maximization by recognizing the corporation's character as a
social institution as well." Under this model, a corporation cannot simply act as a profit
engine, but must also take into account the social externalities that attend its activities.
See Redmond, supra note 52, at 73-74.
96. Murphy, supra note 13, at 400.
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broad and aspirational or detailed, and (4) operational in nature. 97 The
codes often refer to accepted international norms,98 many times
emphasizing an adherence to domestic regulations.99 Sometimes the
codes are created on an ad hoe basis to apply to a specific corporate
entity, while at other times the code is formulated for an entire
industry.'00 For example, the Apparel Industry Partnership ("AIP"), a
partnership of labor, industry and consumer representatives, established
a workplace code of conduct regarding apparel and footwear industries
that U.S. manufacturers are currently being asked to adopt.
A. A History of Corporate Codes
Corporate codes made their first significant appearance in the late
1980s.' O' Perhaps one of the best known of the earlier corporate codes
was what is known as the "Sullivan Principles. '0 2 Created in 1977 by
Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, these codes were first adopted in the
1980s. 103 The Sullivan Principles, which consisted of six principles,
were developed to help guide corporations dealing in South Africa
during apartheid.'0 4 Among the principles was a ban on segregated
eating, and a similar ban on segregated work facilities.10 5 There was
also a commitment to placing non-whites in management positions.1
0 6
One hundred and fifty MNCs made the pledge to these principals.1
0 7
Another early and influential system of corporate codes was the
"MacBride Principles."'' 0 8 These too were promulgated in the 1980s.'0 9
97. Id.
98. Such as the ILO core labor principles.
99. Murphy, supra note 13, at 400.
100. Id. Among other key labor issues, the code contains provisions regarding child
labor. Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Code of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private
Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 111 (Fall 1998).
101. Redmond, supra note 52, at 87.
102. Murphy, supra note 13, at 394.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 124.
109. Id.
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They were established to reduce discrimination against Catholic workers
in U.S. MNCs operating in Northern Ireland." ° These codes promoted
hiring, training, and advancement on a non-sectarian basis."' As of
1995, 40% of U.S. MNCs operating in Northern Ireland had subscribed
to the MacBride Principles."'2 The MacBride principles serve as an
excellent example of how corporate codes can be used to address the
unique situation of a particular MNC.
U.S.-based clothing manufacturers and retailers were the first to
utilize codes." 3 Many of these codes were adopted as a form of
insulation - an attempt by corporations to protect themselves from the
labor practices of their foreign subsidiaries. 1 4 Others were created as a
response to specific incidences which created negative publicity." 5 The
first corporate codes were individualized.1 6 These codes were voluntary
and based on an OECD inventory of modem corporate codes. These
remain the most prevalent.' The next most common type of code is the
"industry wide" code." 8 This form of code is adopted by an industry or
trade association after the members of that industry or association are
given the opportunity to reach a consensus regarding its content." 9 The
remaining percentage is divided between those codes created by
international organizations and those created by multistakeholders1
20
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Redmond, supra note 52, at 87.
114. Id. at 88.
115. Id. atn.55.
116. Id. at88.
117. OECD, Working Party of the Trade Committee, Codes of Conduct - An
Expanded Review of Their Contents, TD/TC/WP(99)56/Final Fig. 1, available at
http://applil.oecd.org/olis/1999doc.nsf/c16431 elb3f24cOac12569fa005dld99/
c12568d1006e0lb9c12568f70035dd97/$FILE/00078855.DOC (last visited Apr. 17,
2006). According to the OECD inventory, 48% of corporate codes are voluntary and
individual. Id. Many of these individual codes contained either "guidelines for the
conduct of suppliers and business partners, a statement of the company's commitment
to the public,... [or] guidelines for the company's employees." Redmond, supra note
52, at 88.
118. OECD, supra note 117. According to the OECD inventory, these types of
codes represent 37 percent of modem corporate codes. Id.
119. Redmond, supra note 52, at 88.
120. Id. The committee appointed by the U.N. Economic and Social Council
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As of yet, there is no uniform method of reporting codes.
12 1
Therefore, there is no precise information regarding their content.
122
The OECD inventory, however, indicates a high level of consistency in
particular sectors12' and a similarly high level of consistency with regard
to content. 124  Of the codes inventoried, 60% referred to labor
standards. 25 Of these codes, 25% make mention of "human rights,"'
26
while 43% mention child labor. 27 "Numerous codes also specify what
is to be done if a child is found to be in the employ of a sub-contractor
(e.g. the child is to be taken care of until some alternative is found -
return to family, re-entry into school, etc.). Other codes do not specify
whether any special obligation to the child exists.'
28
B. The Strengths of Corporate Codes
As discussed above, MNCs operate almost entirely outside of the
control of the existing domestic and international legal systems.
29
Currently, only the consumer, with his/her ability to undermine the
fundamental purpose of corporate action - a power that is not
constrained by boundaries or international legal principles - can
challenge and change MNC behavior. ' ° It is, however, within the
corporate prerogative to decide the most appropriate way to conform to
consumer expectations. This solution is found in corporate codes.
While the individual and voluntary nature of corporate codes is a
("ECOSOC") to study the impact of MNCs has attempted to create a code of conduct
for transnational corporations. The process has taken fifteen years, with the latest draft
submitted in 1990. The draft was never adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, mainly
because of the insurmountable resistance from developing states to what some have
referred to as "economic neo-colonization." Murphy, supra note 13, at 403-04.
121. Redmond, supra note 52, at 89.
122. Id.
123. OECD, supra note 117, at table 2. More than half of the corporations with
individual codes were involved in trade. The next most numerous sectors were textiles
and chemicals and extractive industries. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Redmond, supra note 52, at 89.
128. OECD, supra note 117, at 14. "Also, to not employ child [labor] is the most
frequently mentioned commitment (36 out of 37 codes)." Id.
129. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
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weakness in that violations of the code do not result in what could be
called "traditional" legal sanctions, it is also one of their greatest
strengths.' 3 1 Individual and voluntary codes need not be precise.
1 32
Where uniform legal strictures tend to ignore unique corporate
circumstances, each MNC or industry can draft the codes to meet their
idiosyncratic needs, thus eliminating the barrier of achieving a
consensus among the many relevant groups. 3 3 Additionally, though
corporate codes are not empowered with the force and effect of law,
they are entwined with the corporation's public image. 34 Violation of
the codes to which corporations have pledged themselves is a violation
of the public trust. 35  Though there may be no legal recourse, the
consumer may employ his "demand side" power by refusing to purchase
goods or services from that company.
Moreover, where an industrialized country cannot apply its child
labor laws to a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of a domestic
corporation, the social norms of that nation should find their way into
the corporate codes of MNCs based in those countries. 36 The following
hypothetical exemplifies how this could work. An MNC is incorporated
and headquartered in the United States. The U.S. government has been
unsuccessful in using the legal system to prevent this MNC from
employing child labor in the production of its wallets. The wallets are
made in Asia. The MNC sells most of its product in the U.S. and
European markets. 37  The MNC's stock is traded on the NASDAQ.
When the story breaks that the MNC has been employing child labor,
the effect will be most noticeably felt in the markets of industrialized
countries. In these markets, there exists an established aversion to the
131. Redmond, supra note 52, at 90.
132. Id.
133. Id. This note has already detailed one instance where the legal system's
requirement of uniformity combined with the conflicting interests of global players has
resulted in the failure of effective INC regulation. See, e.g., supra note 109.
134. Redmond, supra note 52, at 90.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. This is an assumption of this particular model. While the assumption would
not be necessarily true of all corporate situations, it is important for the point being
made here that the majority of the consumers of the MNC's products live in a society
which does not support the use of child labor, and without judgments we choose these
markets.
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use of child labor.'38 It is also in these markets where the shareholders
as well as the consumers exist. Therefore, when the MNC seeks to
rehabilitate itself (or preempt the situation altogether) through the
adoption of corporate codes, it will establish codes that respond to the
sensibilities of its consumer base.
Lastly, the use of corporate codes may prove to be the most
effective tool in combating the use of child labor because the codes are
more feasible than alternative strategies such as prescriptive
international instruments. 9  They offer the opportunity to effect
practical change at the operating level and work quickly. 4 ' In this way,
they are at the very least logistically more preferable than legal
strictures. '
41
Corporate codes, therefore, could potentially allow for the effective
regulation of many aspects of MNC behavior. Unfortunately, corporate
codes have yet to prove themselves worthy of such adulation. Existing
corporate codes suffer from several impairments.
C. Weaknesses of the Modern Corporate Code
One of the most acute problems with reliance on corporate codes is
that such reliance is only warranted where the corporation is susceptible
to consumer pressure. 42 The more exposed an MNC is to publicity, the
greater the incentive to respond to social pressures by adopting corporate
codes. 143 As a corollary, the more visible MNCs that adopt these codes
are also prone to publicize their doing so.' 44 Accordingly, firms that do
not supply public markets directly will have less of an incentive to
conform to- social expectations. 45 This results in a "halo effect" for
similar MNCs who have not actually adopted such codes.'4 6
Another problem with viewing corporate codes as a solution to all
corporate malfeasance, although not a problem for the child labor issue,
138. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
139. Redmond, supra note 52, at 90.
140. Id. at 91.
141. Id.
142. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 116.
143. Redmond, supra note 52, at 90.
144. Id.
145. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 116.
146. Redmond, supra note 52, at 90.
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is that because MNCs adopt these codes to pacify consumer demands,
they tend to be narrowly tailored to "hot button" issues, ignoring those
activities which get less media attention. 147 As a nation, we appear to be
rather selective when it comes to those labor issues that really concern
us. "'48 As such, an MNC like Levi-Strauss can maintain an image of
corporate benevolence because its code of conduct prohibits the use of
child labor, forced labor, and discrimination, even though its
subcontractors crush employees' attempts to unionize.
149
Another significant problem with current corporate codes is that
many of them are written vaguely or worded in permissive language.15 °
This undercuts any sense of obligation to fulfill the requirements under
the code, or alternately, requires so little of the MNC that fulfilling the
requirements accomplishes nothing.'
For example, the Shell Group, a global group of energy and
petrochemical companies, defines their social responsibility as follows:
"[t]o conduct business as responsible corporate members of society, to
comply with applicable laws and regulations, to support fundamental
human rights in line with the legitimate role of business, and to give
proper regard to health, safety, security and the environment."' 5 2 This
statement is vague. It only commits the company to not violating the
law, but by using the term "applicable" they may, for example, employ
child labor, where doing so is legal.5 3
The Monsanto code of business conduct, on the other hand, creates
affirmative obligations with penalties for violations, but is so vague and
incomplete that it affords the global community no protection.
154
147. Id.
148. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 142.
149. Id. at 128-29.
150. Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy
and Effectiveness of Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes, in DEPARTMENT DES
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Canada) No. 1, Vol. 59, 101 (Jan.
1,2004).
151. Id.
152. Shell International Limited, General Business Principles,
http://www.shell.com/static/royal-en/downloads/sgbp/sgbp_300805.pdf (2005).
153. It should be noted that Shell's General Business Principles do not make specific
reference to the employment of child labor. Id.
154. Monsanto, Code of Business Conduct, http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/
layout/our_pledge/corpgov/code.asp.
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Monsanto's code fails to mention child labor altogether and also pledges
itself only to "comply with applicable laws and regulations." In the
section of their code entitled "Our Commitment to Working Within our
Communities," the code only states that:
[They] understand the impact [they] have on the communities in
which [they]. do business, and ... want to make positive
contributions for the betterment of those communities. [That they]
understand that it is a privilege to be allowed to do business within
our communities, and ... will do their] best to be worthy of the
privilege granted [them] every day.
This section of the code creates no affirmative obligations. One
would be hard pressed to find Monsanto in violation of this section, and
so the MNC is able to tout the code's existence and reap the public
relations benefits without hampering its activities in any meaningful
way.
Additionally, even when an MNC's corporate code specifically
prohibits a practice such as employing child labor, new methods of
global production can work to undermine the commitment. For
example, in the context of international production and distribution,
many MNCs whose corporate codes receive the most publicity do not
manufacture the products they sell. 56 Under the current structure of
many corporate codes, an MNC, if so inclined, can reap the public
relations benefits of establishing Orwellian codes but. can also reap the
financial benefits of the employment of child labor by dealing with
subcontractors who have not made similar pledges.1
5 7
The lack of uniformity among the codes allows MNCs to funnel
their unpopular practices through less visible subsidiaries. 5 8 In this
way, the individual nature of corporate codes, which above was heralded
as a strength, acts as a serious and sometimes debilitating weakness. 5 9
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current system lacks a
credible process to oversee compliance with the codes. 160 A system for
155. Id.
156. Murphy, supra note 13, at 401.
157. Id. at 401-02.
158. Id.
159. This weakness, however, will be addressed in the following part of this note.
160. Simons, supra note 150. While recent times have seen an increase in focus on
monitoring, compared to the need the efforts have not been sufficient.
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ensuring compliance with the codes would be crucial to the effectiveness
of voluntary self-regulation. 161  Without a trustworthy system of
verifying compliance, the totality of the consumer's power cannot be
brought to bear upon the MNCs. On the one hand, where consumers are
only aware that a corporate code is in place but cannot be sure the MNC
is in compliance with that code, the MNC is able to receive the public
relations benefit of having the code, but incurs no obligation to abide by
it.162 On the other hand, where corporations know that there is no such
verification system in place, the cost benefit analysis, as it pertains to
abiding by the codes, is slanted against doing so.
V. BEEFING UP CORPORATE CODES
Consumer influence is both the force that propels MNCs to adopt
corporate codes as well as the source behind their power.163 Effectively
harnessing the consumer's influence over MNC behavior and properly
rewarding "meaningful compliance" with self imposed obligations
require a regulatory scheme that preserves a minimum threshold of
corporate responsibility and is both transparent to the consumer and
unambiguous in its requirements.164
While uniformity is an essential component of effective self-
regulation,16' it may also be the death knell to any regulation.1
66
Whereas the individual nature of corporate codes allows us to
circumvent the need for an impossible consensus among MNCs and
nations with conflicting social and economic interests, a total lack of
even a base level consensus results in an ineffectual system under which
MNCs are able to feign corporate responsibility. If corporate codes are
to solve the most fundamental human rights violations, of which the
employment of child labor is one, these codes - all codes - must
161. Redmond, supra note 52, at 92; see also Liubicic, supra note 100, at 144-50.
162. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 114.
163. See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
164. As used here, the term "meaningful compliance" refers to that behavior which
is in accordance with the MNC's corporate code and fulfills a substantive obligation
beyond the code.
165. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 119, 130-33 and accompanying text.
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achieve uniformity to the extent necessary to reach a minimum threshold
of corporate responsibility.
Accomplishing uniformity first requires that we create a single,
visible, possibly quasi-governmental organization. 167 The organization
will have several charges but no legal authority. Among the most
important of its functions will be the establishment of a rating system.
Each increment on the rating scale should correspond to a set of
definitive and concrete obligations, to which MNCs with that rating
have committed themselves. Base level uniformity is achieved through
the lowest rating. If an MNC wishes to reap the public relations benefits
that corporate codes and socially responsible behavior can generate, they
will be forced to abide, at the very least, to this minimum threshold or
receive no rating.
This approach is not entirely new. A similar method has been
adopted by the Social Accountability 8000 ("SA8000"). 168 SA8000 is a
certification program that was created by the Council on Economic
Priorities Accreditation Association in 1997.169 The program provides
standards for measuring MNC performance in the areas of: "child labor,
forced labor, occupational health and safety, freedom of association,
discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, compensation, and
management.' ', 70  Currently, SA8000 certifies 170 facilities
167. A functional system would require a single, highly visible entity to establish
behavioral norms and verify compliance with MNCs' corporate codes, lest more harm
be done than good. If the system allowed for more than one agency to set standards,
and allowed an agency other than that one to certify compliance, the system would be
promoting "verification shopping." An MNC would be able to shop for a verification
agency, or even create an internal verification division, that either falsifies compliance
unscrupulously, or has such lax standards that the MNCs' behavior qualified as
compliant. The consumer then, we believe, loses his power to a bureaucracy of mirrors.
The corporation gains a degree of separation from compliance, and before the consumer
can evaluate the MNC's actions, it must first evaluate the MNCs evaluator. A system
unified around one agency solves these problems; more so, if that agency is linked to
governmental power. The U.N. would be an excellent organization to administer the
functions that will follow.
168. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 126.
169. Id.
170. Id. SA8000 takes the following position on child labor: "no workers under the
age of 15; minimum lowered to 14 for countries operating under the ILO Convention
138 developing-country exception; remediation of any child found to be working."
Social Accountability International, Promoting the Human Rights of Workers Around
the World 4 (Nov. 11, 2005) , available at http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cftn?
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worldwide. 171 Certification of signatories and monitoring of compliance
"is carried out by CEPAA-accredited certification firms."' 7 2  The
program, however, differs in many important respects from that which is
advocated here. SA8000, for example, does not require the inclusion of
a company's subsidiaries in the certification process. 73  Additionally,
SA8000 does not cover all sectors of production, and therefore cannot
provide the necessary level of standardization.1
74
Alternatively, the organization advocated for here will be charged
with standardizing the language in corporate codes and in doing so will
promote meaningful commitments. 75 After meeting with a cross section
of relevant parties, organizations, governments and MNCs, the agency
will adopt its own model language. 76 If an MNC wishes to ignore the
language suggestions published by the agency, it may do so. However,
this subjects the MNC to the risk that its chosen language will
correspond to an undesirable rating.
This single organization model would have its largest impact in
addressing the weaknesses of current verification processes. Currently,
verification exists, if at all, in three forms: internal monitoring;1
77
fuseaction=document.showDocumentBylD&nodelD =1 &DocumentlD= 165.
171. ld. at 2.
172. Id. As will be discussed later in this note, the multiplicity of actors that the
SA8000 relies on is a significant weakness which will be accounted for by our proposal.
See infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
173. Teresa Fabian, Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) - the first auditable,
global standard for ethical sourcing driven by CEPAA 3 (Jan. 1998),
http://www.woek.de/pdf/glob coc-social-accountability_8000.pdf.
174. Id.
175. The SA8000's certification firms are briefed by local unions and human rights
organizations. Id. at 2. Similarly, the proposed agency would meet with international
organizations, hear suggestions from government representatives and local unions, and
incorporate these suggestions into the guidelines on which they base their rating system.
The agency's language would be drafted with the deficiencies of prior codes in mind.
The language would be precise, coherent and exacting. It would set forth verifiable
substantive requirements which, if accomplished, would result in improved human
rights conditions.
176. The agency would adopt model language suited to each level of its rating
system. An MNC that adopts this language, and is certified for having met its
obligations, would guarantee itself the corresponding rating.
177. Internal monitoring seems to be the most prevalent method used by U.S. MNCs
to verify compliance with corporate codes. Liubicic, supra note 100, at 134.
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foundation monitoring; 7 ' and independent monitoring.'79 Of the three,
independent monitoring allows for the most transparency and for honest
reporting.18' Honesty and credibility are the keys to promoting the
adoption of corporate codes. It is only if the consumer is confident in
the verification process that the full force and effect of their power can
be felt.' To this end, government involvement is preferable, if not
essential. If the agency charged with the task of promulgating the rating
system and language models were associated, or run by, a reputable
international governmental agency such as the United Nations, the
consumer could be confident in its reporting. This way, consumers
would be free to act on their preferences, promoting not only basic
compliance from the MNCs, but maybe also a "race to the top" as these
highly competitive MNCs vie for consumer affection.
Currently, corporate codes are adopted mainly by highly visible
MNCs - those susceptible to consumer pressures. 182  This has
implications for two groups of corporations: those foreign based
subcontractors that are hidden from public view and therefore unaffected
by consumer power, and those companies or industries that operate in a
theater that is removed from the public light, such as manufacturers of
intermediate consumer goods. 183 Our proposed organization would have
the ability to influence, albeit indirectly, the behavior of these hidden
subcontractors. As part of the rating system introduced above, the
agency would include a mechanism for reporting on the behavior of
178. This is where a MNC or group of MNCs, in conjunction with human rights
organizations, establishes a non-profit foundation to monitor and verify compliance. Id
at 135. The members of the boards of these foundations are selected from within the
MNCs and from the groups that joined to create it. Id.
179. See id at 135-36.
180. A major issue with internal monitoring is the massive conflict of interest
problem it creates. Id. at 136. Even if we assume that all reporting is conducted
honestly, the mere appearance of impropriety deprives the codes of the credibility that
is essential for the harnessing of consumer power. Id.
181. We argue that, so long as consumers remain unconfident that MINCs are
complying with their self-imposed obligations, they will give only watered down effect
to their preferences (i.e., that no child labor be used in the production and
manufacturing of a good), thereby diminishing the incentives for corporations to adopt
codes at all.
182. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
183. Intermediate goods are the "raw materials and components that are purchased
by other corporations to make end-use goods." Liubicic, supra 100, at 141.
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every subcontractor used by a rated MNC. This could take the form of a
secondary rating, such as a plus or minus add-on, or it could be included,
like class participation, in determining the overall grade, thus creating an
incentive for MNCs to exert their influence over those with whom they
subcontract.
184
By creating this additional consideration, one which would be
reflected in an MNC's rating, we are able to ameliorate the overall
problem posed by subcontractors.1 85  By tying the actions of these
subcontractors to the public image of the MNCs who use them, we
create a conduit through which consumer pressure can reach these
faceless entities.
Lastly, we believe that by adopting our single organization theory
we will ultimately be able to solve the "hot button issue" problem.
1 86
Currently, only those issues that receive media and consumer attention
make their way into the corporate conscience.' 7 This is not likely to
change soon, nor is it likely that consumers will change to become less
selective with their concerns. The only hope then for those issues now
neglected by our limited concern is for the issues that currently occupy
our conscience to be solved. Solving the current hot button issues will
create a vacuum that conscious consumers will seek to fill. It is only
logical that once these second-order concerns are pushed to the fore-
front, they too will be adopted by the consumer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate codes, if optimally utilized, can make a tremendous
difference in the area of child labor. These codes may also be used to
address many other human rights and environmental issues.1 88 They
184. Some MNCs, such as Wal-Mart, have already taken the initiative and
incorporated provisions regarding their vendor partners and their subcontractors into
their codes. Id. at 129.
185. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
188. In fact, it is important that the rating system used to address child labor issues
accompany a rating for environmental issues. Failing to do so may result in under-
developed nations, which once relaxed labor laws in order to attract MNCs, relaxing
their environmental laws to do the same. Liubicic, supra note 100, at n. 13 1.
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derive their power from the consumer and are, therefore, not limited by
the strictures of international legal polices. They are self imposed,
essentially fueled by the same competitive spirit which until now has
acted as a destructive force in many of these arenas. 8 9 Where once
corporations fought, to the detriment of their workforce, for cheaper
sources of production, they may now battle for the publicity that attends
socially conscious behavior.
The key to maximizing the power of corporate codes is to
effectively address and harness the source of their power. Clarity,
singularity, and credibility are the three most important requirements of
recording and reporting MNC behavior. By creating a trustworthy
mechanism to keep the consumer informed, we increase the chance that
consumers will act on their preferences. Credibility may be achieved
through governmental association, clarity through a simple and well
publicized message, and singularity by the promotion of one agency
supported by all others.190
The goal is to change the corporate cost-benefit analysis when it
comes to the issue of child labor. The stronger the force produced by
consumers (i.e., a refusal to purchase goods made by child labor), the
greater the cost associated with the practice. We hope here to finally tilt
the scales and end this insidious practice once and for all.
189. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
190. Publicity is a necessary predicate to the effective functioning of this plan. In
order to harness consumer power, the consumer must know where to look to find this
information, how to read the information and the basis for the ratings. In the beginning,
the agency, as well as committed human rights organizations, will bear most of the
costs associated with information gathering, compilation, logistics, dissemination and
publicity. Ultimately, the cost of publicity will shift, at least in part, onto those MNCs
with the highest ratings. These MNCs will have an incentive to promote the agency and
its ratings so that they may reap the most possible benefits.
